Brutal Peace: Lieber Code, NATO mission, and personal journey, by Georgia Law 3L Miles S. Porter


In this item, Miles S. Porter, a J.D. candidate in the University of Georgia School of Law Class of 2021, reflects on his Spring 2020 full-semester externship at NATO HQ SACT in Norfolk, Virginia. Miles’ background includes: B.A. degree in international relations and German, University of South Carolina 2011; U.S. Army active duty 2013-2018, including tour in Afghanistan; and U.S. Army reservist since 2018.

Peace can be brutal. I am reminded of this axiom as an unwelcome silence invades my office space from the street below. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought life to what some have called a “peaceful” and “virtual” standstill. But with an unprecedented 30-plus million Americans claiming unemployment in the last month, “brutal” seems a more appropriate descriptor.

Like many of my peers, I finished my spring semester externship from home, a mere 800 socially distanced miles from my worksite, the NATO headquarters in Norfolk. Early on, I had looked forward to watching the 30th flag raised at Norfolk in honor of North Macedonia’s recent membership, to enjoying the parade of nations at the NATO Festival, and to hearing former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General James Mattis speak at the Norfolk Forum. Instead I am at home, reflecting.

While America finds itself embroiled in yet another metaphorical war, against COVID,  perhaps it is appropriate then that my thoughts have ultimately turned to war itself. Specifically, they have turned to a theory of war that decries the paradox of a “humane war.” This paradox is explored in the 2012 book I read as part of my externship tutorial: Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History, by Yale Law Professor John Fabian Witt. A compelling narrative about one of the first codifications of the laws of war and perhaps one of the earliest uses of lawfare, Lincoln’s Code is more page-turning adventure story than legal treatise.

The book’s conclusions, far from uncontroversial, initially resonated with me. But they also raised important questions about the role of NATO, the rule of law, and the future of warfare. This post will examine those questions, then end with some thoughts on my NATO experience.

Now to “Old Hundred.”

“Old Hundred”

The U.S. War Department issued General Order No. 100, also known as the Lieber Code, in May 1863, at the height of America’s bloodiest war. Commissioned by President Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton, and endorsed by the General-in-Chief of all Union Armies, Henry Halleck—an attorney himself—the “Old Hundred” was a necessary contribution to the Union’s war efforts. First, it helped frame the conflict in legal terms, extending law of war protections to prisoners and proving to foreign states that the Union’s actions were in fact legitimate. Second, it enabled Lincoln to achieve his goal of emancipation.

Lincoln had won the 1860 election on a platform that denounced the expansion of slavery into new states. This precipitated the secession of South Carolina even while James Buchanan was still President, and set the nation on the path to civil war.

The story of The Code is told in tandem with the story of its author, and the maxims within are better read as a story of lessons learned. While Francis Lieber was an academic, a professor first at the University of South Carolina and later at what is now Columbia University, he was also a soldier. He was someone who had his family and his life torn apart by war. His sons fought on opposite sides during the conflict he helped to end. Rather than devote himself to pacifism, however, Lieber thought the call to arms was “the most honorable calling of mankind” and that “when carried on by civilized peoples, just wars were the way civilization spread. … Justice, not peace, [was] the highest ideal.”  (Witt 178). Not only did he believe in the importance of just wars, Lieber had kept slaves himself for a time and had seen firsthand the effects of slavery while living in South Carolina. It is in this context that “Old Hundred” should be read.

A notable characteristic of Lieber’s work was that it ran counter to then-conventional doctrine on the laws of war. Lieber openly spoke out against the end of war advocated by the leading contemporary European thinkers (182), preferring the writings of older theorists like Clausewitz. Humanizing wars, in Lieber’s opinion, had the paradoxical effect of prolonging human suffering.  He urged short and sharp wars because “the more earnestly and keenly wars are carried on, the better for humanity, for peace and civilization.” (184) This became the basis for the last sentence in Article 29 of his Code:

“Sharp wars are brief.”

The principle at the essence of the Code is military necessity. As Witt shows, military necessity became an almost absolute power, remarkable for what it forbade and more remarkable for what it allowed. Torture was expressly forbidden but the starvation of villages, emancipation of slaves as enemy property, and martial law were permitted, even expected. And yet the principle persisted, so that in the present day military necessity is one of the five accepted principles of the laws of armed conflict, or LOAC.

“Old Hundred” quickly gained traction abroad. European lawyers and politicians had been searching to codify their own “enlightened” laws of war after over a century of bloody conflicts. To this end, they concluded the very first Geneva Convention in 1864. Yet delegates at that Geneva Conference, influenced by some of the more pacifistic thinkers of the day, had gone in a somewhat different direction than Lieber. Their Convention outlawed some of the barbarities of war, reforming war in the hopes of one day ending it altogether. This approach foretold advancements in the laws of war that would occur in the wake of the World Wars of the 20th century.

Choosing an Approach

The Charter of the United Nations was signed and entered into force in 1945.  A short five years later, the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding document, likewise was signed and entered into force. Today, in 2020, Kabul, Afghanistan, has been the site of armed conflict and a nearly two-decades-long military presence by America and its NATO allies. The fact provokes questions:

  • Is the “forever war” a byproduct of the humanization of warfare?
  • Is that result what Francis Lieber had fought so vehemently against? Or is it merely indicative of the progress made towards the abolishment of warfare as an institution, which the United Nations and its progeny were designed to facilitate?
  • By sheathing the short war, have we lost a valuable weapon in our proverbial arsenal, holding ourselves to morals that our less scrupulous foes may not?

These were the questions that I faced after reading Lincoln’s Code.

Initially, I embraced the short, sharp wars advocated by Lieber, Tolstoy, and Clausewitz. Frustrated by a perceived lack of progress in recent war efforts and the absence of defining victories (ignoring a certain shipboard declaration of victory), my inclination was towards a strategy of power, shock, and awe. I thought that .

After further consideration, I think maybe this initial reaction was a bit rash: While I agree with many of the principles and ideals set forth by Lieber and his short-war sympathizers, I believe that he made some key mistakes. Like many who romanticize, he failed to account for the realities of the world.

If we do the same, we do so at our own peril.

Short wars reached their pinnacle with the Cold War. That is ironic since the Cold War was long – nearly a half-century prompted by the threat of the ultimate short war, nuclear war.  The international community has since demonstrated a strong aversion to this inhumane form of short war, to the point that in a near-peer conflict it may be more than ill-advised, it may be a nearly impossible strategy to pursue.  The changing instrumentalities of war, towards weapons of mass destruction, have altered the calculus of war.  As America’s near-peer adversaries retain an interest in a balanced geo-political environment, even short wars with non-nuclear equipped opponents seems unlikely.  The new realities of warfare include nuclear weapons, and as long as this remains true, the possibility of short wars will remain distant.

Post-Cold War NATO, or NATO 2.0, represents the other side of this equation. The military alliance, initially established as a After the USSR fell, NATO endured. It participated in some of the largest humanitarian efforts of the 20th and 21st centuries, in places like Kosovo, Haiti, and Afghanistan.

In truth, globalization, the threat of nuclear warfare, and a determined international effort to outlaw war have changed the face of warfare completely. Warfare today is about competition, about living in the gray areas of the law. It resembles humanitarian aid more than it does Gettysburg or Antietam.

Democracy, liberty, and the rule of law are the conquering tools of warfare in the 21st century. They have enabled the alliance to grow to 30 full-fledged members, to conclude official partnerships with 20 Partnership for Peace nations, as well as to develop relationships with numerous other nations from disparate corners of the earth, from Australia to Colombia to Pakistan. The great deterrents in today’s conflicts are not so much weapons as they are the financial costs of waging expeditionary wars and the potential damaging of financial systems. In this environment, communities of peace built on a common foundation are capable of outlasting more powerful foes.

NATO is also capable of holding its own during armed conflicts when they arise. (Another discussion could be had about member nations’ willingness to uphold their article 5 commitment of mutual defense, but that is a separate issue.) NATO retains flexibility in the deployment of its rules of engagement, which allow member nations to pursue their individual national interests while retaining a unity of effort. Effective management of NATO forces requires mastery of this concept by commanders across echelons. Once achieved, it leaves the alliance with plenty of capabilities to accomplish the mission.

Irish poet Robert Lynd once said:

“The belief in the possibility of a short, decisive war appears to be one of the most ancient and dangerous of human delusions.”

The short wars envisioned by Lieber require justice to be the prevailing value in the pursuit of national objectives, and that in turn requires the actors pursuing these objectives to act justly.  The limited set of circumstances where this is achievable make his theory complicated enough to make unwise policy.  The abuses of the Code’s ideas that took place in subsequent conflicts, like the one in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, make this clear.  As Witt demonstrated in Lincoln’s Code, the principle of military necessity acted as a cloak that attempted to legitimize abhorrent acts.

Whether organizations like NATO go too far in their pursuit of peace, whether they are influenced too much by groups trying to humanize an inherently inhumane act, strike me as unnecessary questions in today’s environment. Competition will indeed manifest itself as “forever wars.” I find this outcome preferable to the alternative of a persistent nuclear threat. 

Final Thoughts

I have found that even dream jobs can begin to show their faults after a few weeks. While NATO certainly suffers from its shortcomings, this job never lost its appeal. In fact, most of what I initially saw as shortcomings eventually appeared to have been deliberate components of NATO’s grand design. The endless hours needed to exhaust every opinion on a topic until consensus is reached certainly can be challenging. The fact that every nation gets a voice at all, however, is truly amazing.

One of my mentors at NATO once told me,

“The beauty of NATO is that it is.”

I hope that despite its challenges in the future, it will always continue to be.

Georgia Law Professor Kent Barnett on comparative study in “Chevron Abroad,” Notre Dame Law Review article co-authored with Georgia Law 3L student Lindsey Vinson

Pleased today to welcome a contribution from Kent Barnett (near right), J. Alton Hosch Associate Professor of Law here at the University of Georgia School of Law. He reprises his recent Yale Journal on Regulation blog post; it summarizes the forthcoming article, Chevron Abroad, which he co-authored with Georgia Law 3L Lindsey Vinson (above right). An expert on administrative law and related areas—at times using comparative approaches—Professor Barnett’s previous Exchange of Notes contribution is here.

The Kids Will Be Alright—How comparative study can inform U.S. judicial review of agency statutory interpretation

Chevron deference—the U.S. doctrine that calls for courts to defer to reasonable agency statutory interpretations—is under siege. A majority of current U.S. Supreme Court Justices have, at one time or another, expressed concern over its domain, operation, or very existence. Two state courts in the U.S. have overruled their state-law equivalents. Some welcome Chevron’s demise as an antidote to an ever-encroaching administrative state that chafes at statutory limits to authority. Others view Chevron’s internment as nothing but a judicial power grab in the face of ideological hostility to an effective administrative state. For my part, my past research co-authored with Dr. Christy Boyd and Professor Chris Walker suggests that—whatever its downsides—Chevron deference has the benefit of muting ideological judicial behavior. This muting can further national uniformity in lower court decisions concerning agency statutory interpretation.

But is the angst surrounding Chevron worth it? Do we really need to worry that administrative agencies will eventually consume all our liberty if Chevron continues or that the American bureaucracy will become an ineffective wasteland if Chevron ends? Moreover, even those not taken to hyperbolic worry have argued, to varying degrees, that Chevron deference is inevitable—whatever its drawbacks.

To evaluate whether Chevron or something like it exists or is absent in other stable democracies, my co-author, Lindsey Vinson, and I considered judicial review of agency statutory interpretation in five other countries in Chevron Abroad, our forthcoming article in the Notre Dame Law Review. Although we would have liked to see how countries with a presidential system like that of the United States behave, that system is rare, especially among mature legal systems. Instead, we looked at 5 parliamentary systems. These included countries with separation of powers guaranteed in written constitutions, with civil-law legal systems, and with federal systems. Among the countries studied were Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.

Based on our study, we cannot say that Chevron or something like it is inevitable. Only one of the countries that we studied had a doctrine similar, if not more expansive than, Chevron. One has rejected deference altogether, and one has rejected Chevron specifically in dicta. The others, at best, had some small space for deferring to agency interpretations. This variation among these major legal systems also suggests that the existence or absence of something like Chevron does not mean the end of either democracy or an effective bureaucracy. After all, citizens in both Canada—with a strong form of deference—and Germany—without one—have strong confidence in their governments. Of course, we cannot say that any of these systems are operating optimally, but we can say that Chevron existence or absence alone does not appear as significant as the U.S. administrative law cognoscenti often suggests.

In brief, here’s the variation that we found in our study:

Germany. Influenced by its conscious concern over the relationship between judicial abdication and its Nazi past, Germany has its own 2-step deference doctrine that has a much more limited domain than Chevron. Deference in Germany is significantly limited to certain technical, scientific, or economic matters that the legislature has delegated to the agency.

Italy. Italy has had tumultuous doctrinal shifts in the past few decades. As it stands, it has rejected judicial deference altogether when reviewing agency statutory interpretations. But it sends contradictory signals occasionally.

United Kingdom. For decades, the UK has rejected judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation, after having a doctrine similar to Chevron. Although it defers in some instances for “special” matters decided by entities that U.S. law would characterize as agencies, its limited deference arises under its law on charities.

Canada. Canadian judicial review comes the closest to Chevron, with a highly functional, contextual inquiry into whether deference is appropriate for statutory provisions that can support more than one reasonable interpretation. Canada has applied deference even to questions that implicated constitutional or common-law matters.

Australia. Finally, Australia’s High Court expressly rejected Chevron in dicta. Nonetheless, Australia continues to have a very limited, rarely applied doctrine somewhat similar to Chevron when statutes expressly give agencies exclusive jurisdiction and limit judicial review.

Our study also provides insight on how U.S. courts—whether or not they prefer Chevron—could go about improving Chevron in a way that is more consistent with its theoretical grounding.

For instance, Chevron, like other countries’ deference doctrines, is grounded primarily on notions of legislative delegation and expertise. Chevron relies primarily upon ambiguity in a statute that the agency administers to signal legislative delegation. But the presence of statutory ambiguity somewhere in a statute is not the most direct way of assessing either actual delegation or agency expertise on the matter at issue. Germany focus on expertise. German courts permit deference only in limited circumstances—for certain scientific, economic, or technical matters—as a way of ensuring that deference adheres only to matters in which the agency has likely epistemological advantage over courts. Australia has its limited Hickman deference doctrine that requires that the legislature signal its intent with two statutory clauses that it wants agencies (or inferior courts) to have interpretive primacy over the matter at issue. By doing so, Hickman requires a more direct, although not express, signal of legislative delegation than Chevron. These approaches in other countries suggest how Chevron could better ground itself on its theoretical foundations.

We hope that our article will lead more American scholars to consider how other countries approach administrative law matters. Doing so not only provides examples of possible improvements to the American administrative state, but it also helps lower the temperature of academics and judges who worry over the current or future state of Chevron deference.

Georgia Law’s International Law Colloquium returns for Spring 2020

The International Law Colloquium, a time-honored tradition here at the University of Georgia School of Law, returns this spring semester with another great lineup of global legal experts.

This 3-credit course consists of presentations of substantial works-in-progress on a variety of international law topics by prominent scholars from other law schools. In keeping with a tradition established when the series began in 2006, students will write reaction papers on the scholars’ manuscripts, and then discuss the papers with the authors in class. Leading the class will be Harlan G. Cohen, Gabriel M. Wilner/UGA Foundation Professor in International Law and Faculty Co-Director of the Dean Rusk International Law Center. Other Georgia Law and university faculty will join in the dialogues.

Further supporting the colloquium are staff at our Center; in particular, the Center’s Global Practice Preparation team, which includes Sarah Quinn and Catrina Martin. The colloquium further benefits from generous support from the Kirbo Trust Endowed Faculty Enhancement Fund and the Talmadge Law Faculty Fund.

Presenting at the Spring 2020 Colloquium (pictured above, clockwise from top left):

► January 17: Karen Alter, Lady Board of Managers of the Colombian Exposition Professor of Political Science & Law, Northwestern University, on International Economic Governance and Dispute Resolution: A Contractual v. Rule-of-Law Approach? 

► January 24: Monica Hakimi, James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, on Making Sense of Customary International Law 

► February 7: Jorge Contesse, Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law, on The Rule of Advice in International Human Rights Law

► February 21: Karen Knop, Professor, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, on Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp and Foreign Relations Law From the Ground Up 

► February 28: Dan Bodansky, Foundation Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, on Is the Concept of War Really Obsolete? 

► March 20: Fleur Johns, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, and current member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton University, on #Help: The Digital Transformation of Humanitarianism and the Governance of Populations 

► March 27: Rachel Brewster, Jeffrey and Bettysue Hughes Professor of Law, Duke Law, on Corporate Families

► April 17: Matiangai Sirleaf, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School, on Racial Valuation of Diseases

Georgia Law Dean Bo Rutledge, students Katherine Larsen and Miles Porter publish on Cuba sanctions

Recent change in US policy toward Cuba is the subject of a new commentary by the dean and 2 student researchers here at the University of Georgia School of Law.

Coauthoring the Daily Report article, entitled “Lawyers Should Keep Their Eyes on Cuba Sanctions Cases,” were international business law expert Peter B. “Bo” Rutledge, Dean and Herman E. Talmadge Chair of Law at Georgia  Law, along with 3L Katherine M. Larsen and 2L Miles S. Porter.

The article examines the potentially “broad implications for entities that conduct business in or with Cuba” that may follow from the announcement earlier this year that a portion of the mid-1990s “Helms-Burton Act would no longer be suspended, thereby allowing U.S. nationals to file lawsuits against any individual or entity that ‘traffics in property expropriated by the Cuban government.”

The full commentary is here.

Scholarly achievements, thriving initiatives featured in newsletter of Dean Rusk International Law Center

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For a recap of the year’s global law-and-practice accomplishments here at the University of Georgia School of Law, have a look at the just-published annual newsletter of the Dean Rusk International Law Center. Features include:

► Celebrating the scholarly achievements of our many other globally minded faculty and staff, including Diane Marie Amann, Christopher Bruner, Thomas V. Burch, Anne Burnett, Jason A. Cade, Nathan S. Chapman, Harlan G. Cohen, Kathleen A. Doty, Melissa J. Durkee, Walter Hellerstein, Lori Ringhand, Usha Rodrigues, and Peter B. “Bo” Rutledge.

► Events past and future, including day-long conferences cosponsored with the Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, public lectures and our Consular Series of lunch talks with Atlanta-based diplomats, cosponsorship of panels at regional and national international law meetings, and the upcoming International Law Colloquium Series.

► Initiatives aimed at preparing our J.D. and LL.M. students for global legal practice, including our Global Externships and our Global Governance Summer School, plus support for students’ organizations and international advocacy teams.

The full newsletter is here.

Center’s Laura Kagel meets with prospective LLMs in Mexico

portada_esLaw students in Guadalajara, Mexico will have the opportunity to talk with a Dean Rusk International Law Center staffer about pursuing a degree at here at the University of Georgia School of Law.

Laura Tate Kagel, the Center’s Associate Director of International Professional Education, will give a presentation for students this evening, Friday, October 18, at 7:00 p.m. about the LL.M. degree at the University of Georgia.

She has spent the day at the Expo CEEAD (Centro de Estudios sobre la Enseñanza y el Aprendizaje del Derecho), speaking with prospective students about the career benefits and special advantages of earning the Master of Law, or LL.M., degree at Georgia Law. (See prior posts about our current LL.M. students, as well as our hundreds of LL.M. alums, here.)

If you’d like to learn more about the LL.M. degree, please email LLM@uga.edu. EXPO CEEAD information is available here.

Student Caroline Harvey wins cultural heritage writing competition

Caroline HarveyCaroline Harvey, a current third-year student at the University of Georgia School of Law, is one of two 2019 winners of the Lawyer’s Committee for Cultural Heritage Preservation Law Student Writing Competition in Cultural Heritage Law.

Harvey’s paper, “An Avenue for Fairness: Disclosure-Based Compensation Schemes for Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art,” argues that in art replevin actions, courts should take an additional step in their due diligence analyses and consider whether a good faith possessor of stolen artwork should be entitled to compensation after forfeiting artwork to the true owner. This, she argues, would “more fairly balance the equities between the parties and avoid total loss to the good faith purchaser.”

Harvey currently serves as the Executive Notes Editor for the Georgia Law Review. After her first year, she participated in the Global Governance Summer School, and she completed a Global Externship At-Home at the Antiquities Coalition in Washington, D.C.  Last summer, she worked for Norris Legal Atlanta Law Group. She holds a B.A. in Art History from the University of Georgia, and hopes to practice in the areas of cultural heritage and art law.

Georgia Law Dean Bo Rutledge, student Katherine Larsen publish commentary on promise of new international mediation treaty

A new treaty seems poised to raise the profile of mediation as a way of resolving disputes, according to commentary by the dean and a student researcher here at the University of Georgia School of Law.

Coauthoring the Daily Report article, entitled “Singapore Convention Presents an Opportunity for Georgia in Mediation,” were international dispute resolution expert Peter B. “Bo” Rutledge, Dean and Herman E. Talmadge Chair of Law at Georgia  Law, and 3L Katherine Larsen.

The United States belongs to a number of treaties – most notably, the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, concluded in New York in 1958 and so known as the New York Convention – that make make arbitration awards enforceable. This membership, the article observed, “has given arbitration a comparative advantage over other forms of dispute resolution.”

But that could change once the 2018 UN Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation – named the Singapore Convention in recognition of the city where it was concluded last December –  enters into force. Some predict that could happen within a year, the authors wrote, then focused on the significance of this for the state of Georgia:

“Much like it adopted an international arbitration code, the state should consider enacting an international mediation law tied to the provisions of the Singapore Convention. Such legislation could enhance Georgia’s appeal as a mediation forum and build upon its reputation as a jurisdiction hospitable to business, including the resolution of business disputes.”

The full commentary is available here. A Global Atlanta news report on a related talk that Dean Rutledge delivered at the annual conference of the Atlanta International Arbitration Society is here.

“The Future of Space Governance” conference will convene experts on October 28

17-098-Kepler-90_MultiExoplanetSystem-20171214On Monday, October 28, 2019, the Dean Rusk International Law Center and the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law at the University of Georgia School of Law will host a daylong conference to explore “The Future of Space Governance.” The conference will feature a keynote speech by Professor Emerita Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, University of Mississippi School of Law, as well as panel discussions by academics and practitioners.

Participants will consider the following concept note:

International legal frameworks governing outer space developed under the conditions of a bi-polar, Cold War world, where the two great powers were the only spacefaring nations, and were engaged in a feverish race to space. The international agreements reflect the concerns of the time, primarily to prevent militarization and colonization of outer space. It seemed essential to keep the cold war out of space, and to keep it from going hot. Then, the U.S. made it to the moon, winning the race and effectively freezing space governance in Cold War terms.

Exactly half a century later, the world has changed, and so has space. A bi-polar world has gone multipolar, and an optimistic period of multilateralism has given way to a decline in robust international cooperation. Meanwhile, developments in outer space have exploded in complexity, ambition, and commercial promise. The number of entrants and potential entrants has proliferated: seventy-two nations now claim they have space agencies, and at least fourteen have orbital launch capabilities. One of the key new entrants is China, which is busy exploring the dark side of the moon and plans a permanent Chinese lunar colony as early as 2030. India, too, is broadening its ambitions, launching a moon lander trip this year, and planning for manned spaceflight and a space station launch soon thereafter. The SpaceX program is making rocket launches available for bargain basement prices, bringing space activities within the reach of a gaggle of startups keen to grab their piece of the commercial pie. Other commercial actors imagine space tourism, colonies, and missions to Mars. At the same time, the United States, still the dominant player in space, has announced plans to launch a “Space Force,” aimed at defense of U.S. military interests from space.

Fifty years after the first moonwalk, the prospect for a new set of multilateral agreements governing outer space is remote, yet the legal questions raised by new space activity are mounting. With little prospect of new multilateral treaties, outer space governance will need to make do with existing law, generate customary rules to govern new applications, and develop forms of sublegal understanding and cooperation.

This conference takes a stakeholder approach to emerging questions of outer space governance. It seeks to understand the perspective and concerns of classic space powers, new entrants, non-space faring nations, and international organizations like the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as well as civilian space agencies, national militaries, and commercial actors. It asks for views on the sufficiency of existing law and governance structures and probes the legal needs of new and existing stakeholders. It will explore the agendas of the growing collection of actors, and attempt to find new prospects for governance.

Here’s the schedule:

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8:45-9:00  Welcome

Peter B. “Bo” Rutledge, University of Georgia School of Law

 

9:00-10:30  New Entrants: Nations

What are the emerging governance challenges as new nations emerge as space-farers?

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Steven Mirmina, NASA

Saadia Pekkanen, University of Washington, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

Cassandra Steer, Women in International Security Canada

Charles Stotler, University of Mississippi School of Law

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Moderator ǀ Harlan G. Cohen, University of Georgia School of Law

 

10:45-12:15  New Norms? Commercial Actors

What norms govern, or should govern, potential commercial uses such as extraction, tourism, and settlement?Panel 2

Julia Selman Ayetey, McGill University

Frans von der Dunk, Nebraska College of Law

Brian Israel, ConsenSys

Mark J. Sundahl, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

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Moderator ǀ Melissa J. Durkee, University of Georgia School of Law

 

Gabrynowicz_hi_res_small1:15-2:00  Keynote

Professor Emerita Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, University of Mississippi School of Law

 

 

2:15-3:45  New Uses: Security in Space

What are the appropriate responses to the new U.S. “Space Force” and other threats of space militarization?

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Mariel Borowitz, Georgia Tech, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs

David Kuan-Wei Chen, Center for Research in Air and Space Law, McGill University

James Gutzman, United States Air Force

Andrea Harrington, Air Command and Staff College, Air University

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Moderator ǀ Diane Marie Amann, University of Georgia School of Law

GJICL EIC3:45-4:00  Closing Remarks

Lauren Elizabeth Lisauskas, Editor-in-Chief, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law

 

 

Registration, CLE credit, and other details here. Additional cosponsors include the International Law Society, Georgia Law’s chapter of the the International Law Students Association.

Introducing our LL.M. Class of 2020

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From left, top row:  Arif Iqbal; Esra Aydinoz; Emmanuel Kyei; Gordon Oduor; Kingsley Opia-Enwemuche; Jessica Atatigho; Romario Lee; Cindy Hawkins Rada. Bottom row: Florence Nalukwago; Tahmineh Madani; Rayan Yassin; Hiance Castro; Jie Zhang; Mahbub Islam; Shiyang Liu; Maisha Tahsin. Not pictured: Ashish Joshi, Amir Tanhaei

We are proud to introduce the University of Georgia School of Law Master of Laws (LL.M.) Class of 2020.

The group of 18 includes lawyers from 14 different countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, including: Bangladesh, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda.

They join a tradition that began at the University of Georgia School of Law in the early 1970s, when a Belgian lawyer became the first foreign-trained practitioner to earn a Georgia Law LL.M. degree. In the ensuing four decades, the law school and its Dean Rusk International Law Center have produced over 500 LL.M. graduates, with ties to 75 countries and every continent in the world.

Side by side with J.D. candidates, LL.M.s follow a flexible curriculum tailored to their own career goals – goals that may include preparation to sit for a U.S. bar examination, or pursuit of a concentration affording advancement in their home country’s legal profession or academic institutions.

The application for the LL.M. class of 2021 is now open; for information or to apply for LL.M. studies, see here.